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Further Developing Transpersonal Psychology as a Science: 
Building and Testing Middle-Range Transpersonal Theories
Further developing transpersonal psychology as a science has been impeded by the over 
emphasis on two approaches to building theory, namely grand theories that attempt to 
explain everything and mini-theories that avoid explaining much of anything. In between 
these extremes are “middle-range” transpersonal psychology theories that can better allow 
for scientific progress. They bracket metaphysical and supernatural approaches common in 
transpersonal grand theories, and accept the possible generalizability of findings commonly 
rejected by transpersonal mini-theories. The transpersonal construct of self-expansiveness 
illustrates one way that middle-range transpersonal theories can lead to a program of 
cumulative empirical research and empirically informed practices. Other transpersonal 
constructs, such as awe, can also be good candidates for building and testing middle-range 
transpersonal psychology theories.
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For transpersonal psychology to thrive, both as science and praxis, it must rely on empirical evidence, not simply faith or dogma, to support its 
claims (Friedman, 2002). Whether starting inductively 
from empirical observations, deductively from extant 
beliefs, or more intuitively through some process of 
abduction, transpersonal concepts must be amenable to 
empirical approaches to be part of the scientific process. 
In this regard, empirical refers to being accessible 
to experience via the senses, both outer (e.g., vision) 
and inner (e.g., proprioception), congruent with how 
contemporary cognitive psychologists (e.g., Solso, 2001) 
include consciousness as awareness of “objects” in both 
physical and phenomenal space. 
It could perhaps also apply to other ways of 
experiencing (e.g., using active imagination; Jung, 1997), 
if these could be brought into a consensual framework 
for others to corroborate, as some agreed upon referent 
is always needed for the data gleaned from scientific 
observations. This requires that truth claims can be 
disputed (and neither embraced as part of an untestable 
faith, nor foisted upon others as authoritarian dogma). 
In essence, science requires that any appropriately 
trained observer be able to replicate scientific claims, 
rather than having to blindly accept them. Scientific 
theories integrate empirically accessible concepts into a 
type of structure, which can be seen as an explanatory 
mechanism (see Bunge, 1997) based on some organizing 
principles (e.g., logic, mathematics, graphical depictions) 
that provide for what can be called explanation, and 
also the ability to make predictions (hypotheses) 
that are testable using empirical data (see Jaccard & 
Jacoby, 2010). For a scientific theory to grow, it needs 
to build upon the iterative interplay of both empirical 
data and theory. Scientific theories cannot be isolated 
from empirical observations or they would only be 
philosophical speculations, while traditional worldviews 
(e.g., astrological systems) and even contemporary 
religious faiths (e.g., Buddhism) are not part of science 
per se, insofar as they do not rely on empirical evidence 
for their claims. In previous writings, I have criticized 
portraying both astrology (Friedman, 2002) and 
Buddhism (Friedman, 2009, 2010) as sciences. Although 
both are not sciences in my view, they can be used to 
further science in many ways (e.g., as in generating 
scientific theories reframing their beliefs and practices). 
One starting place for building scientific transpersonal 
theory is to operationally define (i.e., in a way that is 
empirically accessible through a specified procedure) 
concepts that serve as the fundamental components of 
theory. For this purpose, I developed a construct (i.e., a 
type of concept that is created specifically to be used in 
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science), which I called “self-expansiveness” (Friedman, 
1981, 1983). It refers to how the boundary drawn around 
one’s sense of self (i.e., self-concept) can vary from being 
narrowly constrictive to broadly expansive. Although I 
maintain that self-expansiveness can provide a fruitful 
way to create and develop a variety of transpersonal 
psychology theories, it is just one among many other 
possible concepts that offers heuristic potential for 
empirically developing and testing such theories through 
programs of cumulative research, as well as for furthering 
evidence-based transpersonal psychology praxis. 
Theory and Science
Transpersonal psychology can be seen as an attempt to replace traditional spiritual and folk 
psychological worldviews with perspectives congruent 
with those of modern science, and which can develop 
scientifically through empirical research. Specifically this 
means making these perspectives amenable for empirical 
exploration. In this way, transpersonal psychology 
straddles conventional science and other disciplines 
focusing on spirituality and related concerns, attempting 
to meld them together in a way that benefits from the 
openness of empiricism, while still considering some of 
the most profound questions typically relegated to non-
scientific pursuits by the mainstream. Transpersonal 
psychology as a science also is focused on applications, 
namely empirically informed practice. 
Scope of Theory
One way to view theories is to look at their 
scope, or the range of phenomena they attempt to explain 
(Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). The leading transpersonal 
theories have been in the tradition of “grand theory” (as 
delineated from mini- and middle-range theory; Merton, 
1968), which means they often attempt to explain too 
much, which usually means they end up explaining little 
of scientific worth. Two examples of such over-reaching 
transpersonal work are Wilber’s (2001) A Theory of 
Everything and Laszlo’s (2004) Science and the Akashic 
Field: An Integral Theory of Everything, both of which 
unabashedly profess to explain everything. Essentially 
what such grandiose works provide are mythic accounts 
about reality. These may provide comforting illusions of 
sense-making to the largest questions of meaning and 
purpose, but these operate outside of a framework of 
science, and are more similar to the explanatory stories 
told around campfires since the advent of humankind 
(and to the many current religious ideologies that invoke 
supernatural and metaphysical causation). Although 
these accounts could provide not only comfort, but also 
socio-cultural adaptation (i.e., by unifying disparate 
groups under common beliefs), they also often led to 
strife—as people are all too willing to kill over their 
differing untestable beliefs about such matters. As closed 
systems, grand theories cannot be questioned empirically 
and are therefore unavoidably authoritarian, whether 
based on inner faith or enforced by external power. The 
Freudian tradition is an example of a grand theory, as 
it can be used post hoc to explain virtually everything, 
from art history to zoological evolution, without being 
able to provide definitive tests of its assertions. In 
contrast, more useful scientific theories require openness 
and the capacity for growth, while grand theories offer 
little opportunity for generating improvements through 
empirical efforts. Although there are thriving traditions 
of psychoanalysis that continue to evolve, these are 
more influential within the humanities and other non-
scientific disciplines than in psychology. Grand theories 
result in scientific stagnation, placing them in a cul-
de-sac making them more akin to folk psychology and 
religion, where open questioning is discouraged, if not 
banned. Many of the approaches that have dominated 
transpersonal psychology since its inception suffer the 
problem of being grand theories and, thereby, outside of 
the scientific realm. 
Perhaps Wilber’s (e.g., 2001) extensive work is 
the best example of this. It spins complex conjectures 
employing esoteric language that is mostly without 
empirical referents. This is not to deny that some 
empirical work has been conducted on its notions (e.g., 
Sehrbrock, 2007). However, the sheer mass of Wilber’s 
work is overwhelming, which is exacerbated by the fact 
that it is constantly being revised (MacDonald, 2007), 
while his scholarly eruditeness can lull readers into 
passively accepting its many empirically unfounded 
conclusions. Problems with Wilber’s approach have 
been clearly pointed out by Ferrer (2002), among other 
critics. My main concern is that, like the legendary King 
Procrustes, Wilber attempts to place everything into 
universal categories, providing a so-called perennial 
vision that embraces everything, whether or not it 
fits well into his system (and, when something does 
not fit so well, Wilber does not hesitate to make post 
hoc adjustments to ensure it fits). Wilber’s approach 
also suffers from employing many supernatural and 
metaphysical concepts, such as the notion of non-
duality, which elude empirical examination. In my 
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view, his grand theory veers closely toward becoming 
a new religion, while at best it is a philosophical, but 
not scientific, effort. Although no science, including 
psychology, is totally free of underpinning philosophical 
assumptions, the history of psychology has been one of 
evolving from philosophy, which engages in speculations 
that do not require subsequent empirical evidence. 
This is not to denigrate philosophy, which in itself is 
a valuable enterprise, but simply to delineate it from 
science, including transpersonal psychology. The first 
step in developing a scientific transpersonal psychology 
is to escape from the shadow of such grand theory by 
creating theories that are empirically accessible and able 
to generate testable hypotheses that can challenge their 
claims and foster their evolution.  
One avenue of such escape would be to seek refuge 
in what can be called mini-theories (Merton, 1968), which 
attempt to avoid overly large generalizations by making 
sense of specific phenomena within delimited contexts. 
For example, in attempting to explain the diversity of 
various transpersonal systems across cultures by imposing 
a singular universal structure upon them, which could 
be seen as oppressively colonialistic, mini-theories can 
explain how they differentially operate within their 
local contexts as indigenous psychologies (Allwood & 
Berry, 2006). These allow for ways to understand diverse 
spiritual traditions from an emic (or cultural insider) 
perspective, which could be adaptive in cross-cultural 
encounters (e.g., in understanding a specific spiritual 
path from the perspective of those who are immersed 
in it). Just as there was fear that anthropologists would 
“go native” when involved in cross-cultural research by 
abandoning their etic (or cultural outsider) discipline, 
there is a similar occupational hazard for transpersonal 
psychologists, who also frequently go native by 
embracing exotic traditions and thereby abandoning 
scientific efforts (see Wallis, 2003). This relates to the 
frequent confound in transpersonal psychology in which 
traditional worldviews and spiritual approaches are often 
taken whole as being themselves psychologies, when 
in fact they are typically not scientific, but based on 
metaphysical and supernatural assumptions (Friedman, 
2002, 2005, 2009, 2010). This makes cultivating an 
emic perspective potentially hazardous for those who 
desire to maintain their so-called scientific objectivity 
through keeping an etic perspective. However, having 
an emic perspective can be useful, if the etic perspective 
can also be kept intact. For  example, while challenging 
beliefs held by many practitioners within the martial art 
of Aikido, I brought an outsider’s scientific perspective 
onto transpersonal a practice in which I long had been 
involved as an insider (Friedman, 2005). 
Ferrer’s (2002) participatory approach appears 
to be arguing for mini-theories when it champions the 
diversity of all spiritual traditions as seen on their own 
terms. He apparently minimizes their commonalities in 
an effort to avoid promoting the hegemony he critiqued 
in Wilber’s (e.g., 2001) grand theory. Such mini-theories 
allow for acknowledging and respecting cultural 
differences, but essentially they build silos that separate, 
abnegating the possibility of finding useful connections. 
This can lead to considering all transpersonal systems 
as incommensurate, rather than part of potentially 
meaningful patterns (i.e., scientific laws) that can 
further development of scientific theory. Unfortunately, 
Ferrer’s participatory approach, like the grand theory he 
aptly critiqued, does not offer any specific strategies that 
would position it well as a scientific approach. Rather, it 
appears to promote only a vague research agenda, which 
I think could be subsumed under the long tradition of 
inter-subjectivity studies (see Fuchs & Jaegher, 2009). 
Organic inquiry (e.g., Clements, 2004) is an example of an 
approach to building mini-theories within transpersonal 
psychology congruent with Ferrer’s participatory vision, 
as it explicitly does not seek to generalize results from 
its data and advocates full (including from transpersonal 
perspectives) participation of the researcher with little 
regard for any so-called objectivity in its data-near 
descriptive research. I see the products of this type 
of research as being similar to journalism, and at the 
borderline of the scientific tradition by virtue of being 
more descriptive than interpretive (however note, 
journalism is a worthwhile endeavor in and of itself, 
and is not clearly distinguishable from social sciences; 
Weaver & McCombs, 1980). 
In between the two extremes, namely grand 
theories that attempt to explain everything and mini-
theories that avoid explaining much of anything, are 
“middle-range” theories (Boudon, 1991; Friedman, 2002; 
Merton, 1968). Rather than trying to  explain everything, 
these theories carve out a limited, but not so limited as 
to be just local, context in which to explain how things 
might operate, and they attempt modest generalizations 
across local situations in search of regularities without 
becoming fixated on either grandiosely explaining 
everything or humbly denying the possibility of any 
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useful explanations. Middle-range approaches focus 
on balancing the interplay between theory and data 
without privileging either, while recognizing the equal 
importance of both, providing a solid foundation upon 
which to further develop scientific theory. In contrast, 
grand theories can be seen as overly focused on building 
one-size-fits-all theory to the exclusion of attending to 
the specifics of data, while mini-theory can be seen as 
overly focused on gathering specific data to the exclusion 
of building generalizable theory. As must be evident, I 
am a strong proponent of middle-range transpersonal 
psychology theory (M-R TPT), which I position within 
a post-positivistic epistemology (Popper, 2001/1937) 
congruent with methodological pluralism (Dawson, 
Fischer, & Stein, 2006; Robbins & Friedman, 2009). 
My approach neither claims that M-R TPT needs to be 
veridical to any ontological truth, nor does it privilege any 
singular empirical method as inherently better or worse, 
but it is pragmatic for building a science of transpersonal 
psychology, as well as supporting transpersonal praxis. 
Concepts and Constructs
To build M-R TPT, transpersonal psychology 
needs scientific concepts that are amenable to clear 
operationalization for testing hypotheses that derive 
from theories, as theories again are simply linkages 
between and among concepts. This in turn can lead 
to further theory building and then further empirical 
research in an open and iterative cycle that characterizes 
the scientific process, and differentiates it from closed 
approaches. Scientific strategy facilitates progress, 
rather than stagnation, and differentiates transpersonal 
psychology as a science from traditional worldviews 
and religions, as well as philosophy (note, my intent is 
not to denigrate traditional worldviews, religions, or 
philosophy, but to separate them as different, but neither 
better nor worse, from science). However, it is especially 
important that transpersonal psychology not attempt 
to be a New Age religion by advocating for stances that 
are supernatural and metaphysical, while hypocritically 
posing as a science.  
Consequently, building M-R TPT first involves 
developing clearly defined concepts that are empirically 
accessible. Concepts can be gleaned from natural 
language, but to build a theory of scientific worth 
using terms employed in natural language can be quite 
problematic. For example, one natural language concept 
that is relevant to transpersonal psychology is “awe,” but 
it is a quite ambiguous term, so I and a colleague recently 
used qualitative methods to clarify it (see Bonner & 
Friedman, 2011). This type of clarification is especially 
important within transpersonal psychology, where 
natural language terms often employ contradictory 
traditional usages, which can be especially difficult to 
define when imbued with supernatural and metaphysical 
baggage. Additionally difficult is when the meaning 
of words radically change over time—as in the case 
of awe, which has shifted from originally describing 
an overwhelming sense of fear (e.g., as reflected in the 
recent U.S. military campaign titled “shock and awe”) 
to now describing a predominantly positive emotion 
(e.g., the ubiquitously overused slang of “awesome” as 
a positive exclamation). In our recent research, Bonner 
and I focused on clarifying this term to make it more 
useful for building M-R TPT, and our intent was to 
operationalize it through later creating an empirical 
measure useful for testing M-R TPT involving awe. A 
natural language term that is clarified this way takes 
on less ambiguous meaning by being specified in ways 
delineating what it does and does not mean, preparing 
it for operationalization and making it more useful for 
theory building. 
Constructs are a special type of concept that are 
acknowledged as being artificially created (i.e., not used 
in natural language) and have scientifically designated 
meanings, even if they may refer only to imaginary 
entities without clear veridical connection with any 
reality. To avoid the problems with imprecisely specified 
natural language terms, it may be simpler to coin a new, 
more precise, term not found in ordinary usages. In that 
sense, scientific constructs, although expressed in natural 
language terms, are created for theoretical purposes. As 
such, they do not need to be real in any veridical sense 
when used to build theory, and often it is important 
to refrain from prematurely reifying them, as they can 
simply be temporary place markers for what may or may 
not later justify the ontological status of being deemed 
“real.” However, to be part of science, there has to be 
some potential at least for them to earn such a status by 
being amenable to empirical observation. One current 
example of a construct is the Higg’s boson or so-called 
“god particle.”  It has long been a sought prize in modern 
physics as a needed complement for extant theories in 
physics, despite that its actual existence was until recently 
only speculative—and whether or not its existence has 
recently been empirically verified is subject to much 
debate (Ellwanger, 2012). The point is, prior to being 
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supposedly found, the Higg’s boson was constructed 
as something needed to have scientific theory make 
sense, so it was only a place marker for what was not 
yet known, yet was seen as a useful fiction for building 
and testing theory. What made the Higg’s boson within 
the realm of science, and not within the realm of the 
supernatural and metaphysics, is that as a construct it 
was potentially amenable to empirical scrutiny, even if 
that had to wait until a huge super-collider was built to 
test for its existence. Many transpersonal notions used 
in grand theory, such as non-duality (Wilber, 2001), are 
unavoidably metaphysical and supernatural. In contrast, 
science as an empirical endeavor is limited to the study 
of the physical and natural, namely that which is 
phenomenal (i.e., can be experienced empirically). Terms 
without empirical referents, such as non-duality, pose 
insurmountable scientific challenges when employed 
as building blocks for developing M-R TPT. At a 
minimum, to begin specifying the diverse meaning of 
these terms into narrower categories would surely offend 
some in spiritual traditions who might use the terms 
in their own parochial ways, while finding empirical 
referents for them would be impossible. 
When an adequate natural language concept 
does not exist, but a new concept is created to be 
useful for theory building and testing, it is called a 
construct (i.e., something constructed, rather than 
given). Consequently, I coined the neologism “self-
expansiveness” (Friedman, 1981, 1983), which I defined 
as referring to the flexibility in the boundaries everyone 
draws around their sense of self (i.e., self-concept), and 
I emphasized that this boundary, which can range from 
quite narrow to quite expansive, includes the possibility 
of  transpersonal self-expansiveness. Note that, after the 
advent of search engines, I recently found that some 
others had used this same term in different contexts and 
with different meanings than I ascribed to it, but my 
usage was constructed for a specific purpose, namely to 
be used to build and test M-R TPT. Self-expansiveness 
is presented as not being necessarily the best concept (or 
construct) for building M-R TPT, rather it is just one 
among many potential contenders, such as awe, that 
holds heuristic potential for developing M-R TPT by 
being operationalizable for empirically testing.  
Why Transpersonal Psychology 
Should Be Scientific
I have long advocated that transpersonal psychology should be a science (e.g., Friedman, 1981, 1983). In 
an earlier “manifesto” (Friedman, 2002), I made a 
number of arguments for this conclusion, which I briefly 
summarize in this section. I start with the fact that 
transpersonal psychology is positioned as a subfield of 
the discipline of psychology by virtue of its name. As 
such, transpersonal psychology is widely recognized, 
and benefits by being seen, as a science. Juxtaposing the 
terms transpersonal and psychology clearly implies that 
whatever transpersonal psychology might be, it relates 
to psychology, which makes it part of a recognized 
scientific endeavor. Regarding the academic aspects of 
transpersonal psychology, this understanding places 
it within psychology departments, while in terms of 
praxis, it opens the door for legitimacy in the eyes of 
those seeking and paying for professional services. In the 
clinical arena, potential clients seeking traditional healing 
(e.g., from someone invoking a supernatural intervention 
within a religious tradition) or New Age healing (e.g., 
from someone employing a pseudoscientific energy 
device) would clearly not expect the same protections or 
expertise based on science as they would if going to a 
licensed psychologist. Anyone claiming to be an applied 
psychologist would be seen as having at least some 
scientific background and training when claiming that 
title, even if not possessing actual expertise. Likewise, 
when a scholar produces a work as a psychologist, 
there are expectations related to the scientific basis of 
such a product. Even if the term transpersonal is used 
as a qualifier, specifying the type of psychology being 
practiced or produced, it does not act as a disqualifier that 
allows one to operate outside of the scientific tradition. 
Those who use the term transpersonal psychology but 
eschew science, yet garner benefits from their practices 
and work products through being associated with the 
science of psychology, are perpetuating a potential 
ethical, and possible legal, breach.      
Beyond this encumbrance lies a more basic issue, 
namely is it even possible for transpersonal psychology to 
actually be a science? Braud (1998), among others, raised 
this question, and many reject the possibility of a scientific 
transpersonal psychology, despite that I advocate for 
this on many grounds (see Friedman, 2002). After all, 
central aspects of the transpersonal are often defined 
as being ineffable, dealing with realities beyond the 
ordinary senses and transcending all conceptualizations. 
However, science is founded on empiricism, and the 
scientific process operating in transpersonal psychology 
can be described as an effort toward reducing that which 
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was formerly seen as ineffable into that which literally 
makes sense (as in being in accord with the world as 
one can empirically find it through the senses). But 
what about aspects of the transpersonal that are clearly 
outside the bounds of science, such as non-duality and 
other empirically inaccessible concepts (e.g., soul) that 
seem to transcend ordinary reality? People usually 
experience the world, including themselves, through 
an implicit Cartesian divide, which perceptually splits 
their sense of subjectivity from objectivity, separating 
the sense of self as lived from a world that is perceived 
as being other than the self, including dividing their 
own sense of self into the subjective “I” and objective 
“me” (James, 1890). So how can such a radical divide be 
handled by scientific approaches, as transcendent states 
(e.g., non-duality, unitive consciousness, etc.) would 
abnegate all conventional bases of knowledge involving 
separation between knower and known? These questions 
pose a conundrum that lead me to the conclusion that 
transpersonal psychology cannot be scientific unless it is 
constrained into abandoning its focus on transcendence. 
Although disallowing speculations about transcendence, 
by labeling that as non-scientific, reduces the scope of its 
study, I see it as unavoidably necessary if transpersonal 
psychology is to be scientific. Some might see this stance 
as destroying the heart of transpersonal psychology, and 
leaving only trivial concerns for it to study. However, 
this is the trap that I believe underlies the continuing 
fascination of transpersonal psychology with grand 
theory, including the many problems stemming from 
such a fascination. 
To escape this trap, I believe it has to be 
forthrightly acknowledged and accepted that there are 
areas within the transpersonal that truly elude scientific 
efforts. The solution I proposed (Friedman, 2002) 
involves delimiting transpersonal psychology using 
one simple maneuver, namely dividing that which is 
transpersonal into two components: its transcendent 
and non-transcendent aspects. In this regard, a scientific 
transpersonal psychology can bracket all concern about 
the transcendent, as that is not amenable to empirical 
approaches or even conceptualization itself. In fact, 
whatever transcendence might be and/or not be (as the 
most basic state of being itself cannot necessarily be 
predicated or denied to it) is undefined, but I loosely take 
it to be anything that is supernatural and metaphysical 
(e.g., that might be outside of space and time). Again, 
science can only deal with the natural and physical.
Conceptualization, which is one of the 
foundations of science, seems logically to require a 
Cartesian split between knower and known, and any 
direct, non-mediated knowing would not be conceptual 
but of another ilk that is outside of the parameters 
of science. By bracketing sticky metaphysical and 
supernatural issues, and focusing instead only on the 
non-transcendent aspects of the transpersonal, a scientific 
transpersonal psychology can be developed. This does not 
mean, however, that the transcendent cannot be studied, 
only it cannot be studied under the guise of psychology, 
which is a scientific endeavor. To study the transcendent 
directly would involve way more than science could ever 
capture, as approaching the transcendent would seem 
to require going beyond both limited concepts and data 
into other possible non-scientific frameworks and ways 
of knowing. This bracketing, which I have championed, 
requires acknowledgement that transcendence eludes 
efforts to reduce it into a scientific paradigm, as it is 
avowedly supernatural and metaphysical. 
However, such bracketing does not prohibit a 
scientific transpersonal psychology from dealing with 
many other important, even crucial, transpersonal 
concerns through M-R TPT. But it does undermine 
the metaphysical and supernatural notions prevalent 
within transpersonal grand theories, while it also avoids 
the cacophony of focusing only on local understandings 
as in mini-theories. Despite possible protestations that 
might allude to potential ways to directly research the 
transcendent (and that somehow would surmount 
the Cartesian divide), frankly I have never seen a 
successful example, nor do I think this is possible while 
maintaining a scientific vantage (and I eagerly await 
being proven wrong in this regard). Instead, I accept that 
science is unavoidably caught in this divide and has to 
operate within limited parameters that allow it to study 
only empirical phenomena. Grand theory may attempt 
to bypass this divide by offering fancy construals that 
are inclusive of everything, but these are empirically 
unfounded, while mini-theory does not even approach 
the divide by instead staying close to the particulars.
For those who want to study the transcendent, 
there are non-scientific approaches that remain available, 
such as through religion, poetry, and other artistic 
expressions, seeking direct attainment via meditation, 
contemplation, and many other avenues, which all 
can be called aspects of transpersonal studies and 
can involve a plethora of non-scientific transpersonal 
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practices (Friedman, 2002). These endeavors are neither 
intrinsically more or less valuable than science, but they 
are not science. Likewise, there are many other sciences 
besides psychology that can study the transpersonal from 
non-psychological perspectives, such as transpersonal 
anthropology and sociology. Collectively, all disciplines 
that study the transpersonal can be subsumed under 
transpersonal studies, whereas a subset of these can be seen 
as scientific, one of which is transpersonal psychology. 
My solution does not foreclose on the legitimate right 
to study or practice the transpersonal in any way, but 
it does require clarity that non-scientific approaches to 
transpersonal studies are not part of psychology. Simply 
put, not all ways to know are scientific, and both scientific 
and non-scientific ways have their relative advantages and 
disadvantages. This delineation also makes it clear what 
transpersonal psychology can and cannot entertain as a 
science, namely again that the transcendent is outside of 
the boundary that science can successfully consider.
What Is Left for 
Transpersonal Psychology to Study?
Some might think that this leaves transpersonal psychology to only consider trivial issues, while it 
abandons its major concern on transcendence. However, 
science can be quite broadly construed, even if it cannot 
deal with transcendence, and can deal with many exciting 
and important issues that are not transcendent. That which 
is transpersonal does not have to only be supernatural and 
metaphysical, as there is a realm of the non-transcendent 
transpersonal that is amenable to science, which I am 
trying to carve out for M-R TPT. For example, to feel 
a merger of one’s identity with another during the 
experience of love-making can be transpersonally self-
expansive, yet this may be a transpersonal experience 
that is non-transcendent, namely an experience that 
only overcomes the sense of being an isolated individual 
but that does not necessarily lead to any supernatural or 
metaphysical experience. A sense of dyadic oneness, in 
which two are merged in identity but still exist as separate 
from others within the larger cosmos, is not the same as 
a non-dual experience of unity with the entirety of the 
cosmos and beyond—and that obliterates any possibilities 
of conceptualization. Although both can be seen as 
transpersonal, the former would be non-transcendent and 
amenable to scientific study, whereas the latter would be 
transcendent and outside of the purview of science.  
Regarding the methods of science, James (1890) 
proposed a radical empiricism, which is congruent with 
my vision of transpersonal psychology as a science. 
For example, people ordinarily perceive from an inside 
versus outside perspective toward the world, delineated 
by using their skin as the boundary. Conventional 
science tends to only look outward, but what occurs both 
within and outside of the skin is within the purview of 
science, such that science can focus on inner data, even 
if they seem subjective and resistant to objectification, 
as well as more conventionally can focus on outer data, 
such as things and other persons. Inner data can be 
obtained through phenomenological methods and, 
with the advent of new technologies, through scientific 
apparatuses, such as electroencephalographs, which are 
simply sensory extenders (see Krippner & Friedman, 
2009). Scientific data can also be collected from various 
states of consciousness, including alternate (i.e., to 
ordinary waking consciousness in Western culture; 
see Tart, 1975) states. To be seen as empirical data, all 
that is required is that information be amenable (or 
potentially amenable) to the senses, while it needs to 
be recognized that the senses can operate under many 
different consciousness states (e.g., under the influence 
of psychedelic substances; Friedman, 2006). As long 
as phenomenological data from an alternate state can 
be accessed with some degree of reliability (again, a 
prerequisite for being a scientifically valid observation), 
either by the same researcher across time or by others, 
it can be studied scientifically. Thus a community of 
meditators who share common practices that alter their 
ordinary consciousness in reliable ways can be seen as 
producing empirical data that are accessible to science. 
Insofar as some in such a community might have what 
could be described as transcendent experiences, these 
would be outside the realm of science to directly study 
(i.e., I would see these direct experiences as noumenal, 
not phenomenal). But these could be brought into 
scientific study as remembrances that are translated 
into concepts, despite that transcendent experiences 
themselves would not be amenable to science. So the 
stories such allegedly transcendence-experiencing 
meditators might tell should be seen as different from 
their direct experiences, and their stories could yield 
good data for science as stories. Last on this point, I 
must admit that I am not even comfortable calling so-
called transcendent experiences an “experience,” as that 
places the term back into limiting Cartesian concepts, 
so even that term should itself only be seen as a loose 
metaphor for an ineffability. 
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From such a broad perspective on science, 
why would studying the transcendent directly be out 
of scientific bounds?  Perceiving phenomena is at the 
heart of empiricism and is based on a differentiation, 
such as in signal detection theory where a sensory 
input, at its simplest, is either deemed present or absent. 
From a transcendent frame, such basic delineation 
falls meaningless, similar to how the so-called laws of 
physics appear to break down under the conditions 
in a black hole. Any attempt to impose categorization 
onto transcendence is simply off the mark, as it reduces 
it to a symbol, such as language or mathematics or 
perhaps a graphical relationship, but such symbols are 
not “it,” only faint shadows of whatever it might be 
and not be simultaneously. Even if one were to have a 
transcendent experience in any meaningful sense, it 
cannot be attributed to that one as an individual, as at 
the point of such experience individuality would seem 
to dissolve. Likewise, to try to conceptualize about 
it later would necessarily portray it in reduced terms, 
and even to attempt to remember it would seem to be 
only a translated blur reconstructed within dualistic 
memory. One could extemporaneously dance or sing 
as an attempted depiction of a transcendent experience, 
but even such a free expression would only be at best a 
loose translation of the ineffable. To attempt to capture 
anything that could be meaningfully called transcendent 
within a scientific frame with its demands for logical 
consistency and empirical accessibility is more than 
challenging as, in my opinion, it is simply not possible.
Conclusion
This paper outlines a guide to building M-R TPT as an alternative to both grand theory and mini-
theory. In order to build M-R TPT, emphasis is placed 
on developing concepts, including constructs, that are 
empirically accessible and relevant to transpersonal 
psychology. This requires bracketing concepts that are 
metaphysical and supernatural, as they are outside of the 
purview of science. A viable transpersonal psychology 
based on such development can lead to useful theories, 
cumulative programs of research, and applied practices 
that are empirically supported. One construct that could 
be useful for this purpose is self-expansiveness, which 
is discussed in greater depth elsewhere (e.g., Friedman, 
1983; 2013a). It is introduced to provide a concrete 
example of how M-R TPT can be pursued. However, 
other concepts, such as awe, are also potentially useful 
for such a purpose. 
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